In light of yesterday's post about Nagasaki, I wanted
to share this from Darwin Catholic--though I have to be honest; I'm still trying to figure out just what it means:
The fact of the matter is, identifying the right side of history is easy -- indeed so easy that it's easier if one doesn't actually know much about history. So easy that there is virtually no moral action involved.
To be sure, choosing the wrong side of history can be a significant moral wrong. To support the Nazis or support slavery or support Stalin in this day and age shows a deeply twisted moral sense. But to oppose these three is so easy, and so obvious, from this point in history, that there is little to no virtue involved.
To congratulate oneself for admiring the right side of history is to assign oneself virtue one has not earned. Indeed, it is often more a sign of pride than of virtue. Without question, we should admire those in history who acted virtuously, but we should not consider ourselves to have performed any great virtue by doing so. Nor should we be quick to consider ourselves the superiors of those "ordinary people" in history who failed to rise to the standards of our heroes. We look at their actions with all of the clarity of distance, and none of the danger of immediacy.
In one sense, I have no particular quibble here. If what Darwin Catholic is saying is simply that we don't get to puff ourselves up pridefully for seeing (at the safe distance of the future) what was right about the past, and what was wrong--especially while ignoring our present sinfulness--then I agree. There is nothing so tiresome as the kind of person who is forever proudly excoriating his ancestors in the Bad Old Days, who approved of a) racism, b) sexism, c) environmental waste, or d) all of the above, while ignoring his own approval of abortion, for instance.
But if we're talking about, say, the discussion as to whether or not it was morally licit to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we have entered into a different sort of discussion. When I talk about this, I may sometimes dispute some of what gets repeated as fact--that Truman had no other, better choice, that an invasion was definitely going to kill at least a million people on each side (or more or less, etc.), and so on, but my judgment concerning the morality of the dropping of the A-bombs does not depend in any way on these contingencies. Truman could have believed with the utmost sincerity that the Japanese were secretly planning a massive invasion of California, that this invasion was imminent, and that it would give them a foothold in America from which to fight a protracted and likely successful war of occupation against us--and it still wouldn't have given him the ability to drop the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in a morally licit way. The use of nuclear weapons in populated areas**, given that it always involves a hugely disproportionate killing of innocent civilians, is always gravely morally evil and outside the parameters of the Just War theory.
What changes based on circumstances is something that neither I, nor you, nor any historian or philosopher, nor any other human being is capable of judging--and that is the level of moral culpability of those who acted to drop the bombs.
I can't know if or the extent to which President Truman is personally morally culpable for the evil of the decision to use the bombs on Hiroshima or Nagasaki; nor can I know the personal moral culpability or the extent of that culpability of any of the people involved in the creation, building, and planning stages of these dreadful attacks. That the acts were evil, however, I can state--and not only because of what Darwin Catholic calls the "clarity of distance;" I can state this based on the moral principles involved.
Now, does this make me better than people who cheered and celebrated here in America when the bombs were dropped? I happen to know the answer to that one, and it's not a pretty answer--no, because up until I was at least thirty years of age I always believed that the United States had been perfectly justified in dropping those bombs, and looked down on those who thought otherwise as lily-livered hippies who lacked the resolve to deal with Our Enemies (who went from the Soviets to Saddam Hussein in Gulf War I to others, as I recall) as they should be dealt with.
I'm not proud of that time in my life, and I don't offer any particular excuses for it (except for the excuse that every Catholic of my generation has, which is that we were abysmally catechized; I think that I might have heard of the Just War theory, but I certainly had no idea that it frowned on things like, say, nuking entire cities full of civilians). I believed that the "No nukes!" people were all Peasnjustess types, aging liberal nuns who were as passionately against nuclear weapons as they were for socialism and bad pantsuits. I believed that to criticize America's conduct in a great conflict like World War II was to hate America herself.
The story of how I came to see my errors is long and boring, and bears a lot of resemblance to the story of how I came to see my errors regarding torture, so I won't describe it here. Suffice it to say that in convincing myself that the US was justified in using the A-bombs, I also had to think of the Japanese people as somehow deserving of that kind of destruction--to think of them, in fact, as less than human.
So when I say, now, having worked through my errors and come closer to the mind of the Church on this subject (not at all by my own merits, but by grace, and the kind example of others wiser than me), that I'm not at all trying to judge those in the past who approved of the bombs, or defended their use, or otherwise tried to make excuses for them, I mean that most sincerely. It is the job of God alone to judge the hearts of men. But it is our job, all of ours, to seek the truth--even if encountering that truth is unexpectedly painful and productive of the natural sorrow we might legitimately have, at what man is capable of doing to man.
**I leave open the possibility of using a nuclear device in an unpopulated area for a beneficial purpose, such as destroying an asteroid hurtling toward Earth. The bad effect of truly awful movies being rushed into production after such an event is outweighed by the good effect of Earth not being destroyed, or at least decimated.
UPDATE: Jimmy Akin with an important new post on the subject.
9 comments:
If you are right, and this is what a serious Catholic ought to believe, than no serious Catholic ought to be president of the United States, because the person in that position has to put defending the United States first. It would be impossible to conduct modern warfare without violating these standards, not just atomic warfare, but anything involving the bombing of cities for instance. You would also have to say that taking out (killing) intelligence operatives who have been exposed, for instance, is wrong. You would have to say that if we could have managed to have Hitler assassinated, that would have been wrong.
I don't see any way of operating a modern state according to these principles.
Susan Peterson
I would be very surprised if Darwin meant the latter. We can and should evaluate previous actions if for no other reason than to shape our moral understanding and avoid illicit action in the future.
Susan, you're failing to make a very important distinction. It is always intrinsically evil to deliberately target innocent people. Not all bombing falls into this category. When a target is chosen that has clear a military function, it can be targeted licitly, even if collateral damage is posible, as long as all attempts are made to avoid deaths of innocents. In most cases, targets are chosen with these considerations in mind. In addition, the munitions used these days allow for much more precision in targeting, so modern warfare can still operate under the doctrine of Just War.
As far as targeting exposed operatives or world leaders, we certainly can operate without doing either and, in fact, operate under these constraints the majority of the time. We should do so always.
Jimmy Akin has an article up at NC Register explaining how the principle of double effect works in such circumstances and thedifference between an act that is intrinsically immoral and one that is extrinsically immoral.
Susan, the Catechism puts it this way:
"2314 "Every act of war directed to the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants is a crime against God and man, which merits firm and unequivocal condemnation."110 A danger of modern warfare is that it provides the opportunity to those who possess modern scientific weapons especially atomic, biological, or chemical weapons - to commit such crimes."
Now, some people have argued, re: Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that the bombings were not *directed to* the killings of innocent civilians, but that their deaths were "collateral damage." While that strains credibility on its face, even if it were true, there is no way that the killing of a combined total of roughly 200,000 people was a *proportionate* risk--in other words, no military target's destruction could possibly be worth the deaths of 200,000 people.
And one may not kill civilians disproportionately or "indiscriminately" as the Catechism puts it. Bombing a military building knowing that a certain number of civilians may be inside or nearby is one thing; dropping a nuke on the city to get the building knowing that 100,000 civilians will die is another.
And as far as I know--someone can correct me if I'm wrong--the assassination of a political leader is also outside the bonds of Catholic teaching.
What I am questioning, which Theocoid addressed to some extent but you are not, is whether it is possible to defend a modern state within the bounds of what the Catechism states is moral.
Susan
@Susan:
I don't see any way of operating a modern state according to these principles.
I don't understand. Why can't you run a modern state according to these principles?
jj
Red Cardigan,
I'll admit one of the reasons that I happened to type up the post that day was that I'd seen a rather "look how enlightened I am compared to most Americans" post in reference to the anniversary of Nagasaki, by it's actually a post I'd had in hopper, so to speak, for a number of months. There are 1-2 follow-ups I need to write to complete the thought, dealing with proxy morality through advocacy.
For what it's worth, I originally hit on the term when I realized that I allowed myself to feel rather too much righteous anger and virtue through identifying strongly with the North during the Civil War. And this led me to think of other examples where we allow ourselves attribute virtue to being on the right side of history in regards to events safely before our lifetimes.
Darwin, thanks for this! I agree with you that the temptation to think that we're more virtuous than the people of the past remains strong in all of us. We should never say "Look how enlightened we are," or even "Look how sinful they were."
Instead, we should probably say, "Look at how people with a stronger cultural awareness of God still failed to recognize the evil of this particular act--God spare us from a similar fate!" Because there, but for His grace, go all of us.
On the other hand, Scripture is chockablock with "we have sinned, us and our fathers before us". Like it or not, later generations critique the moral choices of their ancestors. And with good reason: our ancestors are subject to sin like we are and we are expected to learn from their mistakes. That's not an ocassion for pretending we are better than they are. But it is an occasion for the action of grace.
That, and I think it's important to avoid "I'm a good person because..." formulations with which we attempt to tell ourselves that we're uniformly good because we:
Would have marched with the civil rights movement.
Would have helped hide our Jewish neighbors from the Nazis.
Advocate against abortion.
Advocate for the environment.
"Are in solidarity" with the poor.
etc.
Virtue is something we achieve through action, one action at a time. We don't simply become "good people" because we're on the right side of some one, big abstract thing.
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